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Abstract: This paper provides an account of Kierkegaard’s central criticism of the Danish
Hegelians. Contrary to recent scholarship, it is argued that this criticism has a substantive
theoretical basis and is not merely personal or ad hominem in nature. In particular, Kierkegaard
is seen as criticizing the Hegelians for endorsing an unacceptable form of intellectual elitism, one
that gives them pride of place in the realm of religion by dint of their philosophical knowledge.
A problem arises, however, because this criticism threatens to apply to Kierkegaard himself. It is
shown that Kierkegaard manages to escape this problem by virtue of the humorous aspect of his
work.
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Over the past few years, there has been a significant shift in opinion regarding Kierkegaard’s
relation to Hegel. The old view, popularized by Niels Thulstrup among others, saw Kierkegaard
as a bitter adversary of Hegel.1 It understood the two as having substantive theoretical
disagreements concerning a number of important issues. Thulstrup even went so far as to say,
“Hegel and Kierkegaard have in the main nothing in common as thinkers, neither as regards
object, purpose, or method, nor as regards what each considered to be indisputable principles.”2
In a recent influential book, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, Jon Stewart
takes issue with this interpretation. He rejects wholesale the idea that Kierkegaard was an
adversary of Hegel. He maintains that Kierkegaard was “strongly and positively influenced by
Hegel”.3 He adds that any criticisms Kierkegaard appears to direct at Hegel have little if anything
to do with Hegel. On the contrary, they have to do with a number of Danish thinkers who
adopted a form of Hegelianism.4 More importantly, Stewart argues that Kierkegaard’s dispute
with these Danish Hegelians was personal rather than theoretical. That is to say, Kierkegaard did
not offer substantive criticisms of their views, only attacks on their character or how they lived
their lives.5
The goal of the first half of my paper (§§1-4) is to argue for an intermediate position
between the old view and Stewart’s more recent view. Against the old view, I will embrace the
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idea that Kierkegaard primarily intends to attack the Danish Hegelians and not Hegel.6 Against
Stewart’s more recent view, I will argue that Kierkegaard’s criticisms of the Danish Hegelians
are not just ad hominem attacks. I will show that Kierkegaard has a substantive theoretical
objection to level against them as well. In particular, he criticizes the Hegelians for endorsing an
unacceptable form of intellectual elitism, one that gives them pride of place in the realm of
religion by dint of their philosophical knowledge.
The goal of the second half of my paper (§§5-8) is to address the problems that arises for
my interpretation. The most important problem will be that, if my interpretation holds,
Kierkegaard’s attack on intellectual elitism threatens to become incoherent. On the one hand, he
appears to be telling the Hegelians that philosophical knowledge is not important in the realm of
religion. On the other hand, this very message seems to constitute a piece of philosophical
knowledge that is important in the realm of religion. That is to say, Kierkegaard’s position seems
to reduce to something like the following paradox:
Here is a bit of philosophical knowledge that is important in the sphere of religion:
‘Philosophical knowledge is not important in the sphere of religion.’
I will argue, however, that this problem is a pseudo-problem. A careful inspection of
Kierkegaard’s position reveals that it does not amount to the forgoing paradox. Thus, my
interpretation does not render his position incoherent after all.7
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Nevertheless, as we will see in §3, the relevant positions set forth by the Danish Hegelians have parallels

in Hegel’s own writings. Thus Kierkegaard’s objections to the Danish Hegelians will apply to Hegel himself to
some degree, even though Kierkegaard did not primarily intend them to do so.
7

Earlier versions of the paper were presented to the Philosophy Colloquia at Indiana University (2

November 2007) and Colgate University (13 June 2008), the Midsouth Philosophy Conference (23 February, 2008),

4
1.

The Two Sides to Kierkegaard’s Critique of Hegelianism

Kierkegaard’s critical assessment of the Danish Hegelians can be found in a number of different
texts. But perhaps the most famous critique, and the one I will focus on in this paper, comes from
the pseudonymously published Concluding Unscientific Postscript to “Philosophical
Fragments”.8 The fictional author of this work, Johannes Climacus, presents us with what he
calls “the misunderstanding between speculative thought [a catchphrase referring to the Danish
Hegelians] and Christianity”:
But primarily I sought through my own reflection to pick up a clue to the ultimate
misunderstanding. I need not report my many mistakes, but it finally became clear to me
that the deviation of speculative thought… might not be something accidental, might be
located far deeper in the orientation of the whole age—most likely in this, that because of
much knowledge people have entirely forgotten what it means to exist and what
inwardness is.9

and the Søren Kierkegaard Society Group at the Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical
Association (18 April 2008). I am grateful to those who attended for their comments, especially Noel Adams.
8

I will respect Kierkegaard’s request in “A First and Last Explanation” that we not attribute passages found

in his pseudonymously published works to him (Kierkegaard 1992, p. 627). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the
criticism Climacus levels against the Hegelians, viz. that they are weighed down by “too much knowledge”, can be
found in texts published under Kierkegaard’s own name (Kierkegaard 1993a, pp. 22, 36; 1993b, p. 153). Moreover,
the theoretical basis for this criticism, viz. Climacus’ egalitarian conception of Christianity, can also be found in
Kierkegaard’s signed works. (I will refer to the relevant passages here as the paper proceeds.) Thus it is very likely
that Climacus speaks for Kierkegaard regarding the matter at hand.
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The problem mentioned in the final clause of this passage—that excessive knowledge has led the
speculative thinkers to forget what it means to exist—becomes something of a mantra for
Climacus. He brings it up repeatedly throughout Postscript, almost always using the same
wording (CUP, pp. 120, 215, 249-250, 263, 264, 269, 274n, 280, 571). Thus there can be little
doubt it stands at the center of his assessment of the Danish Hegelians.
Many recent scholars interpret Climacus’ mantra as picking out an unhealthy
psychological disposition.10 According to this view, the speculative thinkers have gotten caught
up in their speculative thought and the knowledge it promises to provide. The unfortunate result
is that they have missed out on, ignored, or “forgotten” what really matters: actually living out
their own lives (CUP, p. 344). To use Climacus’ religious language, they have spent all their
time reflecting on Christianity instead of engaging in the everyday tasks of becoming and being
Christians (CUP, p. 606). Simply put, their speculative thought has become a distraction.11
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do not literally possess “too much knowledge.” Rather, they get caught up in the activity of acquiring knowledge. A
more literal approach to Climacus’ description of their problem is possible and makes some sense. For example,
Climacus often talks about how the Hegelians have acquired knowledge of Persia and China, French and Italian,
water works inspection and geography, even astronomy and veterinary science (CUP, pp. 164, 259, 307n, 351, 464,
469, 498). The problem with this great knowledge, he says, is that it makes knowledge of everyday existence seem
trivial by comparison. (After all, of what importance is the life of one individual human being compared with all of
world history?) Because the Hegelians see knowledge of everyday existence as trivial, they do not pay any attention
to it. However, Climacus thinks it is precisely knowledge of everyday existence that is important for authentic
existence. Thus we can see how the actual possession of great knowledge leads the Hegelians astray. That being
said, I do not think much hangs on the details of how we cash out the problem. Everything I say about the less literal
interpretation will apply, mutatis mutandis, to the more literal interpretation.

6
If we stop here, it seems as though Climacus does not have any objections to level against
speculative thought. He seems rather to have personal quarrels with particular speculative
thinkers. His problem, in other words, is not with Hegelianism per se but rather with particular
Hegelians. In fact, this is the conclusion that Stewart draws in Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel
Reconsidered.12
Contrary to Stewart, I do not think we should stop here. While I agree Climacus refers to
an unhealthy psychological disposition when he talks about “knowing too much,” I do not think
that is the end of the story. I think there is something else going on between Climacus and the
speculative thinkers besides an attack on their character. Underlying Climacus’ ad hominem
attacks, I detect a substantive theoretical objection. Let me explain.
As I intend to demonstrate in the next two sections (§§2-3), at least part of the reason
why the speculative thinkers spend so much time thinking is that they believe thinking is
important. More to the point, they believe thinking is important for Christian existence. Far from
believing they have gone astray when engaging in speculative thought, they see themselves as
performing an essential Christian task.
Now if Climacus’ objection were merely personal and not theoretical, he would agree
with this position. He would acknowledge that speculative thinking is an essential Christian task.
(A refusal to acknowledge this point would amount to a theoretical disagreement with the
Hegelians and eo ipso move his objection beyond the domain of the merely personal.) But, as I
will show in section four, Climacus does not acknowledge this point. He denies that speculative
thinking is an essential Christian task. In fact, he claims that speculative thought plays no role
whatsoever in Christian existence (CUP, p. 571). Therefore, Climacus’ objection is not merely
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personal. It is not simply that the Danish Hegelians engage in too much thinking. He is also
criticizing them for believing that thinking is important in the first place. And that is a theoretical
point, not just a psychological or personal one.
2.

The Speculative Project

To get a better handle on this dispute, we must take a closer look at the speculative position. One
helpful place to start is with a debate that occurred during Kierkegaard’s student days between
one of the Danish Hegelians, Hans Lassen Martensen (1808-1884), and some of the other Danish
luminaries of the time. Recent scholarship has shown that Kierkegaard was well acquainted with
this debate and that much of what he says about speculative thought was a response to it.13 Thus
the debate serves as a particularly appropriate backdrop for our discussion.
It is actually Martensen’s dissertation that indirectly sets off the debate.14 A reviewer of
the dissertation, Johann Alfred Bornemann (1813-1890), declared that Martensen had attempted
to identify and move beyond two theological positions on the relationship between faith and
reason: (i) rationalism and (ii) supernaturalism.15 According to Bornemann, Martensen thought
these positions were “antiquated standpoints that belonged to a lost time”.16 In order to make
progress in theology, it was necessary, in good Hegelian fashion, to “mediate” between them.
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Stewart (2003, pp. 184-195, 339-355; 2004a, pp. 184-207); Waaler and Tolstrup (2004, pp. 208-234)
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English as “The Autonomy of Human Self-Consciousness in Modern Dogmatic Theology” (see Martensen 1997).
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That is to say, Martensen thought it was necessary to find a synthesis of the two positions that
embraced the good parts of each and left the bad parts behind.17
The idea of synthesizing rationalism and supernaturalism struck some members of the
Danish intellectual community as wrong-headed. J.P. Mynster (1775-1854), for example,
insisted that rationalism and supernaturalism were contradictory positions.18 Therefore, by virtue
of the law of non-contradiction, it was impossible to synthesize them. In addition, by virtue of
the law of excluded middle, it was impossible to find some third way to go. Mynster
acknowledged that Hegel and others thought they could disprove or “sublate” these laws. But he
remained unconvinced, citing Aristotle’s point that a rejection of the law of non-contradiction
implicitly appealed to the law of non-contradiction (cf. CUP, pp. 304-305).19 He insisted that
Martensen had to embrace either rationalism or supernaturalism but not both and not some
middle ground between them.20
Martensen’s actual contribution to the debate, his 1839 article entitled “Rationalism,
Supernaturalism, and the principium exclusi medii,” is a direct response to Mynster’s attack. His
goal in responding is two-fold. Primarily, he aims to explain how a synthesis of rationalism and
supernaturalism is possible. But in addition he aims to explain why he rejects the laws of
excluded middle and non-contradiction within the domain of Christianity. (It is worth noting that
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given how Martensen will set up the two positions, they are not actually contradictory. Thus he
does not reject Aristotelian logic in order to synthesize them. His rejection of Aristotelian logic
comes into play at a different place.) Following the presentation given by Waaler and Tolstrup,
we can summarize what Martensen says thus.
According to Martensen, old unmediated rationalism was the view that human reason
could provide us with everything we wanted in the realm of religion without any help from God.
Unaided human reason could ascertain the content of basic Christian dogmas such as the
Incarnation and the Trinity as well as prove their truth. In addition, reason could penetrate these
puzzling dogmas and explain how they were internally coherent. A supernatural revelation from
God that communicated these doctrines was therefore superfluous.21
By contrast, old unmediated supernaturalism was the view that unaided human reason
could do nothing on its own. In order to learn about the Christian doctrines, human beings had to
rely on a supernatural communication from God. Moreover, because reason could not confirm
the truth of these doctrines once they were revealed, humans had to believe them simply on
God’s authority. Finally, because reason could not even grasp their content, the doctrines
remained nothing more than incomprehensible mysteries.22
Martensen synthesizes or mediates these two positions in the following way. On the one
hand, he rejects the self-sufficiency of human reason posited by old unmediated rationalism. As
he had in his dissertation, he insists that human beings must rely on a supernatural revelation
from God in order to become acquainted with truths about the divine. On the other hand,
Martensen rejects the claim made by old unmediated supernaturalism that unaided reason is

21

Waaler and Tolstrup (2004, pp. 215-216).
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helpless. Although reason cannot establish or confirm the truth of the revealed dogmas, it can
nevertheless grasp them on the conceptual level. That is to say, it can show how religious
dogmas such as the Incarnation and the Trinity, which initially appear incoherent, are actually
comprehensible. Here is where Hegelian logic comes into play. For the dogmas become
comprehensible only once the laws of excluded middle and non-contradiction are rejected. And it
is the breakthrough of Hegelian logic that makes such rejections possible.23
In his 1837-1838 lectures on the topic, Martensen associates his position with the
mediaeval slogan “faith seeking understanding”.24 It is easy to see why the slogan fits. Like the
mediaevals, Martensen thinks that we human beings cannot discover the Christian doctrines on
our own. We require a supernatural communication from God in order to become acquainted
with them. Thus, we must start out with a naïve faith, one that simply and humbly accepts
whatever God reveals. But we do not have to stop here; we can go further. By utilizing the
insights of Hegelian logic, we can take the revealed doctrines, which will initially seem
mysterious, and raise them up to the conceptual level. In other words, we can show how the
initially incoherent doctrines actually make sense. Doing so is the goal of Martensen’s
speculative project or what sometimes gets called his “mediation theology”.25
3.

The Existential Payoff of the Speculative Project

I stated above that the Danish Hegelians saw speculative thinking or the speculative project as
important for Christian existence. They believed it would provide them with a kind of existential
pay-off, i.e. benefits for their everyday Christian lives. In order to understand why they held this
23
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position, we can once again turn to Martensen. In particular, we can look at some provocative
comments he makes about the Jews.
In his article on rationalism and supernaturalism, Martensen claims that the Jews did not
reject Jesus merely because they were wicked people.26 They rejected him in part because they
could not understand his claim to divinity. And the reason they could not understand his claim to
divinity was that they embraced Aristotelian logic. The specific sticking point was the laws of
excluded middle and non-contradiction, which ruled out the possibility that contradictory
predicates such as “God” and “man” could both apply to one and the same subject—something
Jesus’ claims to be God entailed. Martensen writes:
It understandably struck them as blasphemy that the supernatural Lord of heaven and
earth should appear here in a natural, human form. Seen from the point of view of logic,
their accusation rested on the principium exclusi medii or on the assumption that the
contradicting predicates “God” and “man” could not be mediated in the selfsame
subject.27
This passage implies that the Jews would have been less likely to reject Christ had they not
embraced Aristotelian logic. Of course, Martensen thinks they would not have embraced
Aristotelian logic had they understood Hegelian or speculative philosophy. Thus the moral of the
story is that the Jews would have been better off, Christianly speaking, had they known the
lessons Hegel was to share with the world.
Martensen uses this story to construct a more general thesis about human nature. He
believes the Jews were not somehow unique in resisting the call to believe what they did not

26
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understand. Almost all reflective believers will get frustrated in such a situation. Moreover, they
will remain frustrated as long as there is tension between faith and understanding or, as
Martensen sometimes puts it, between what theology teaches and what philosophy teaches.28
Thus, reflective believers will not be satisfied with old supernaturalism’s naïve faith in
mysteries. Relief will come only once they have comprehended these mysteries.29 Thus, the
practical payoff of the speculative project lies in its ability to grant people the relief they crave.
And it does so by helping them to acquire religious knowledge.
To put the same point in another way, Martensen embraces a developmental picture of
Christian life. He identifies the final goal of the development, i.e. the ideal mode of Christian
existence, as a state of inner harmony. Among other things, this inner harmony pertains to the
believer’s cognitive faculties. Martensen discusses the idea in a later work:
Human nature is not meant to be divided against itself and to live with a divorce between
faith and understanding. For this reason, we must aspire to harmony in our beings and
strive towards full agreement with ourselves.30

28

Martensen (2004, pp. 592-593); cf. Koch (2004, p. 275).
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Quoted in Koch (2004, p. 375) (my trans.). Koch quotes pp. 46-47 of Martensen’s work, Dogmatiske

Oplysninger: Et Leilighedsskrift [Dogmatic Inquiries: An Occasional Publication], from 1850. The work is a
rejoinder to comments made by Rasmus Nielsen (1809-1884) in Mag. S. Kierkegaard’s “Johannes Climacus” og
Dr. H. Martensen’s “Christelige Dogmatik.”: En Undersøgende Anmeldelse [Magister S. Kierkegaard’s “Johannes
Climacus” and Dr. H. Martensen’s “Christian Dogmatics”: An Investigative Review]. Nielsen saw himself as
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On this line of thinking, the speculative project has practical or existential importance because it
makes this inner harmony between cognitive faculties possible. That is, it paves the way for
human beings to attain the highest mode of existence.
It is helpful and important to recognize that Martensen’s position approximates a position
found in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.31 In this work, Hegel locates one source of human
unhappiness in the alienation from God that many people experience. People feel alienated, he
thinks, because they buy into the Judeo-Christian picture of God as radically different from and
superior to them.32 Viewing God as transcendent and superior makes people unhappy because it
leads them to see themselves as lowly and undignified by contrast.33
Of course, Hegel realizes that Christianity addresses this problem. For example, by
claiming that God has taken on human form in the person of Jesus Christ, Christianity says that
the separation between the divine and the human has been overcome. And by claiming that God
qua Holy Spirit dwells in the hearts of true believers, it says that all human beings can actually
experience unity with God.
31

The exact line of influence between Hegel and Martensen here is unclear. Martensen knew Hegel’s

writings well and may have gotten the relevant position directly from them. That being said, the position in question
was actually quite common in Martensen’s day and age. His teacher, F.C. Sibbern (1785-1872), defended a version
of it as early as the 1820’s (Koch 2004, pp. 94-102). And Sibbern was merely recasting a view set forth by the
German thinker Henrich Steffens (1773-1845), who lectured on it in Copenhagen at the beginning of the nineteenth
century (Koch 2004, p. 275; Schiørring 1982, pp. 179-180). Moreover, Steffens was merely bringing to Denmark an
ideal that was popular among the German Romantics. They too thought that the goal of human development was to
attain an inner harmony of one’s faculties and that the way to achieve this goal was to acquire knowledge (Beiser
2005, p. 37). Thus it is likely that Martensen’s position did not only come from Hegel but had multiple sources.
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Nevertheless, Hegel finds the Christian narrative deficient.34 First, the unity between the
divine and the human that Christianity describes is incomplete. The doctrine of the Incarnation
states that perfect unity occurs in one specific individual (Jesus Christ), not in all human
beings.35 And while all human beings can (at least in principle) enjoy a kind of unity with God
by being filled with the Holy Spirit, this unity is only preliminary—an inchoate precursor to the
full reconciliation that happens in the afterlife.36 Second, the unity with God described in the
Christian narrative is not known or proven. In the case of Incarnation, the postulated unity is
taken on faith. In the case of the Holy Spirit, it is simply felt or intuited.37
One of the main goals of the Phenomenology of Spirit is to overcome these deficiencies.
It seeks to do so by providing a philosophical proof that human beings are identical with God in
important respects.38 The person who follows the philosophical demonstration will experience a
more profound unity with God than the person who simply accepts the Christian narrative. For
he will not see God as a superior being who sometimes deigns to dwell in him; he will
understand God as a superior being that he himself is. In addition, the person who follows
Hegel’s proof will enjoy a more profound connection between faith/feeling and thought than the
person who simply accepts the Christian narrative. For he will not believe, feel, or intuit that he
is united with God; he will know that this is the case.
In conclusion, we can provide a rough summary of Hegel’s view regarding the
importance of philosophy by saying that he thinks philosophy paves the way to a higher mode of
34
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religious existence than would otherwise be attainable. In this respect, his view has much in
common with the one that Martensen defends.39
4.

Kierkegaard’s Position

Kierkegaard flatly rejects Martensen’s claim that speculative thought can provide existential
benefits for Christian believers. In fact, he rejects the entire philosophical tradition of connecting
human flourishing with the acquisition of knowledge. His argument for his position runs as
follows.
4.1.

Part One

The point of departure is Kierkegaard’s egalitarian conception of Christianity.40 Kierkegaard
believes that God sets up Christianity as a universal human task—i.e. a task given to everyone.41
In addition, he believes that out of consideration for fairness, God designs the task so that it is
equally open to and equally difficult for everyone. He declares:

39

If we think about the basic structure of Martensen’s position, we can find additional historical

antecedents. For example, a number of Enlightenment thinkers, including Diderot and Kant, held that the way to
improve humankind was to teach them the arts and sciences (Beiser 1987, pp. 32-33). Moreover, Socrates
maintained that knowledge is virtue and hence that which makes human flourishing possible. Thus he too fits into
the tradition under discussion.
40

Kierkegaard’s egalitarianism has its roots in his theological commitments. Nevertheless, the appeal of

what he says is not limited to those who share these commitments. For the notion of egalitarianism he advocates in
the sphere of religion bears a striking resemblance to the one Kant advocates in the realm of ethics (see Evans 2004,
pp. 91-93; Outka 1982, pp. 171-172). Therefore, everything that follows from Kierkegaard’s egalitarianism should
also be of interest, mutatis mutandis, to those who find themselves attracted to the Kantian ethical tradition.
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But it must always be remembered that Christianity is in no way whatsoever associated
with differences between man and man, the differences of capacities and endowments.
No, no, it offers itself unconditionally to every human being.42
Climacus makes the same point in Postscript:
Let it be ten times true, then, that Christianity does not consist in differences; let it be the
most blessed comfort of earthly life that the sacred humaneness of Christianity is that it
can be appropriated by everyone (CUP, p. 366).43
In a later passage, Climacus adds:
The easiness of Christianity is distinguished by one thing only: by the difficulty… And in
turn the difficulty is absolute, not comparative dialectical (easier for one person than for
another), because the difficulty pertains absolutely to each individual in particular and
absolutely requires his absolute effort, but no more, because in the sphere of the religious
there are no unjustly treated individualities (CUP, pp. 430-431, my emphasis; see also
CUP, pp. 377, 383).
The general idea here is that no one can have a harder time with Christianity simply because she
lacks certain abilities or suffers from unfortunate life circumstances. And no one can have an
easier time simply because she possesses certain abilities or enjoys fortunate life
circumstances.44
It is possible to provide a more precise account of Kierkegaard’s point. An egalitarian
conception of Christianity rules out the possibility that anyone can have an unfair advantage
42

Kierkegaard (1967-78, p. 3:176). See also Kierkegaard (1998, p. 180).
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when it comes to the task of becoming and being a Christian. Such an advantage would exist if
and only if:
(1) Some person P enjoyed some capability or circumstance C that some other person P*
could not enjoy; and
(2) the enjoyment of C provided P with some Christian benefit B that P* could not
acquire in some other way.
A few remarks concerning these two conditions are in order. First, it is not enough that person
P* does not enjoy capability or circumstance C. Her failure to enjoy it must be out of her control;
it must be the case that she could not enjoy it even if she so desired. For there is nothing unfair
about a situation in which person P* could enjoy capability or circumstance C and hence acquire
Christian benefit B, but simply decides not to do so.
Second, by “a Christian benefit,” I mean something that promotes or enhances one’s
Christian well-being. I do not wish to restrict the domain here to things that help one secure an
eternal salvation. I also wish to include anything that helps one live the ideal Christian life in the
here and now. Thus, what ultimately gets counted as a Christian benefit will turn in part on how
we construe the ideal Christian life. But, in general, something that enables one to avoid
obstacles or problems that would otherwise hinder one’s ability to live the ideal Christian life
will count as a Christian benefit. So too will something that enables one to advance farther along
the way towards the Christian ideal than one could otherwise get.
Third, it is important that Christian benefit B cannot be acquired in some other way than
through the enjoyment of capability or circumstance C. If B could be had in multiple different
ways, the fact that one particular way was closed off to some people would not necessarily be
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unfair. It would still be possible for the playing field to be level in a complicated way, with
different people receiving the same benefit from different sources.
4.2.

Part Two

Kierkegaard’s egalitarian conception of Christianity shows its relevance to the matter at hand
when applied to the intellectual differences that obtain between people. If one person cannot
have an easier time with Christianity because of her circumstances or natural endowments, then
by instantiation an intelligent person cannot have an easier time because of her intellectual
acumen. Similarly, a cultured person cannot have an easier time because of her culture and an
educated person cannot have an easier time because of her education. In short, Christianity
cannot be “difficult for the obtuse and easy for the brainy” (CUP, p. 557; see also CUP, p. 469).
It will serve our purposes to bring our more precise account of Kierkegaard’s
egalitarianism to bear on this particular case. Doing so yields the following. For Kierkegaard, no
one can have an unfair advantage with respect to Christianity on account of her sophisticated
philosophical understanding. Such an advantage would exist if and only if:
(1) Some person P grasped some bit of philosophical understanding U that was too
sophisticated for some other person P* to grasp; and
(2) grasping U provided P with some Christian benefit B that P* could not acquire in
some other way.
In what follows, I will refer to this general conclusion as SPUNCA, for Sophisticated
Philosophical Understanding is Not Christianly Advantageous.
4.3.

Part Three

Kierkegaard ultimately rejects Martensen’s claim that speculative thought provides benefits for
Christian believers because it entails a violation of SPUNCA. Here’s why. First, not everyone
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has the ability to engage in speculative thought. In fact, very few people can do so. Thus,
condition (1) for violating SPUNCA is easily met. Second, as we see in the case of the Jews,
those who grasp Hegel’s teachings, i.e. those clever enough to engage in speculative thought,
have an easier time becoming Christians. In addition, those intelligent enough to grasp the results
of the speculative project get to a higher level of Christian existence. Unlike the simple folk who
on account of their simplicity remain at the level of naïve faith, the speculative thinkers acquire
understanding as well. They leave behind naïve faith as “a lesson for slow learners in the sphere
of intellectuality, an asylum for dullards” (CUP, p. 327; see also CUP, p. 609). Thus, condition
(2) for violating SPUNCA is met as well.
In summary, Kierkegaard rejects Martensen’s view because it entails that smart people
have an unfair advantage when it comes to Christianity. To use slightly different words, he
rejects Martensen’s view because it entails an intellectual elitism that is at odds with Christianity.
He has Climacus say:
If the speculative thinker explains the paradox [of the Incarnation] in such a way that he
cancels it and now consciously knows that it is canceled…then there is an essential
difference between the speculative thinker and the simple person, whereby all existence
is confused…and humankind is vexed because there is not an equal relationship with God
for all human beings (CUP, p. 227)
Kierkegaard adds in his journals:
But I cannot escape the thought that every man, unconditionally every man, no matter
how simple he is or how suffering, nevertheless can comprehend the highest, specifically,
the religious. If this is not so, then Christianity is really nonsense. For me it is frightful to
see the recklessness with which philosophers and the like introduce differentiating
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categories like genius, talent, etc., into religion. They have no intimation that religion is
thereby abolished… Think of the highest, think of Christ—suppose that He came into the
world in order to save a few clever people, for others could not understand Him.
Detestable! Disgusting! He is not nauseated by any human suffering, by anyone's
stupidity—but the society of clever people: yes, that would have nauseated Him.45
Thus it is by way of a kind of reductio ad absurdum that Kierkegaard concludes Martensen’s
position must be false. Speculative thought must not provide any benefits that are relevant to
Christian life (CUP, p. 571).
4.4.

Dénouement

Kierkegaard can accommodate his rejection of Martensen’s position in two different ways. First,
he can insist that the speculative project has to fail. The idea here runs as follows: If the
speculative project were to succeed and the speculative thinker could explain away the paradox
of the Incarnation, she would have an advantage over the simple person. Unlike the simple
person, she would not have to believe something she could not understand. The task of becoming
and being a Christian would thus be psychologically less stressful for her. This advantage,
however, would be unacceptable since it would run afoul of the egalitarian nature of Christianity.
Therefore, by modus tollens, the speculative project must fail. The speculative thinker must not
be able to explain away the paradox (see, e.g., CUP, pp. 213-218). In other words, the proper
interpretation of the relationship between reason and religion must be the one Martensen
describes as old, unmediated supernaturalism.46
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The second way Kierkegaard can accommodate his rejection of Martensen’s position is
by interpreting Christianity so that the results of the speculative project simply become
irrelevant. To see how this would work, notice that Kierkegaard rejects the idea that faith
involves simply assenting to certain propositions. He has Climacus explicitly deny that “a
Christian is one who accepts Christianity’s doctrine” (CUP, p. 607; see also CUP, pp. 37, 215,
326). Christian faith is instead something much more personal; it is a passionate and
unconditional commitment to following Christ (CUP, pp. 610-616). By definition, the
unconditionally obedient person will follow Christ whether or not the speculative project
succeeds. Insofar as her faith is concerned, she will be indifferent to the results of the speculative
project. On this interpretation of Christianity, there is no need to claim the speculative project
must fail. Speculative thought provides no Christian benefits simply because its results are
irrelevant to the Christian way of life.47

people should act or what they should do. Climacus asserts that the everyday tasks of religion (CUP, p. 379) and
ethics (CUP, p. 391) must be easy for everyone understand. There must be no difficulty at the point of
comprehending the tasks that would delay people (and the simple people more than the smart people) from moving
on to the more important point of doing the tasks.
47
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at least two reasons why Climacus refuses to do so. First, Climacus fears that those who do not have to exercise a
disposition to believe without understanding will not actually acquire one. On account of their laziness, they will
acquire one only if absolutely necessary. Therefore, true faith—i.e. true unconditional commitment—will arise only
if people are forced to believe against their understanding. Or, as he puts it, true faith will arise only if the object of
faith is an irreconcilable paradox, i.e. only if the speculative project fails (CUP, pp. 230, 610-611, 614; cf. CUP, pp.
423-427). Second, Climacus thinks the true knight of faith is not only willing to pay any price in order to follow
Christ but actually wants to pay it. The knight of faith, therefore, will work hard to keep his understanding at bay
and ensure that he sacrifices it (CUP, pp. 233, 564-565). In this respect, Climacus claims, the knight of faith is like
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But whichever way Kierkegaard goes—whether he goes the first way and insists that the
speculative project must fail or goes the second way and simply says it is irrelevant—the final
conclusion remains the same. Speculative thought must not provide unfair advantages when it
comes to Christianity. On pain of the aforementioned reductio ad absurdum, it must not provide
the elite few who can engage in it with Christian benefits that simple people cannot get in some
other way.
5.

The Apparent Paradox in Kierkegaard’s Position

At the outset of the paper, I said that my interpretation of Kierkegaard would suffer from a
serious problem. It is now time to address that problem.
The crux of the matter is that SPUNCA seems to violate its own rule. That is, SPUNCA
seems to meet the two conditions stipulated earlier for violating SPUNCA. To see why, notice
how it comes across in Postscript:

“a girl truly in love.” Such a girl wants to express her love by paying the highest price for it and becomes
disappointed if she gains the beloved on the cheap (CUP, p. 231).
Climacus’ two reasons for rejecting the second path suffer from a common problem. There is nothing about
them that pertains specifically to the disposition to believe against the understanding. The same reasons should
entail, mutatis mutandis, that the knight of faith must realize all his other difficult dispositions, for example, his
disposition to abandon all his possessions in order to follow Christ. However, Climacus does not require the knight
of faith to realize these other dispositions. With respect to them, he requires only that the disposition exist (see CUP,
pp. 406, 410). Therefore, he seemingly treats the disposition to believe against the understanding as a special case
(Adams 2005, pp. 330-333). Unfortunately, it is not at all clear why it warrants such treatment. It seems Climacus
ought either to require the knight of faith to realize all his dispositions or to concede that the knight of faith does not
have to realize his disposition to believe against the understanding. If he pursues the latter option, which seems by
far the more reasonable one, he could allow for the speculative project to succeed as outlined above.
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First, SPUNCA comes across as a rather sophisticated bit of philosophical understanding.
Climacus offers a number of arguments for it, one of which we just examined. In addition, he
takes over 600 pages to develop its implications, many of which tax even the brightest of minds.
Thus, it would not be surprising if SPUNCA proved too sophisticated for some people to grasp.
Second, SPUNCA—or, rather, accepting SPUNCA—comes across as providing an
important Christian benefit that cannot be had in any other way. Let me explain. Climacus claims
that excessive philosophical reflection hinders people from becoming ideal Christians. In
particular, it leads them to neglect everyday Christian tasks such as loving their neighbors (CUP,
p. 606). Sometimes this neglect occurs because people accidentally get caught up in high-flown
abstract thoughts and consequently overlook their everyday responsibilities. The caricature of the
absentminded professor provides a good example of this phenomenon (CUP, pp. 120-121,
145).48 Other times the neglect occurs because people intentionally postpone the everyday tasks
of faith in order to engage in philosophical reflection (CUP, pp. 23, 27, 200).49 Climacus refers
to an anecdote from Plutarch that brings out the idea:
When Eudamidas in the academy saw the senescent Xenocrates seeking the truth together
with his followers, he asked: Who is this old man? And when the reply was given that he
was a wise man, one of those seeking after virtue, he exclaimed, “When, then, will he use
it?” (CUP, p. 33n)50
Whatever the proximate cause, Climacus thinks one underlying cause of this problem is that
people wrongly believe philosophical reflection is important. More specifically, they wrongly
48
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believe it provides sophisticated philosophical understanding that is advantageous for living the
Christian life. (As we have seen, both Martensen and Hegel hold versions of this view.)
Therefore, if people knew that philosophical reflection was not important in this way—i.e. if
they accepted SPUNCA—they would be less likely to neglect the everyday tasks of faith. That is
to say, accepting SPUNCA would help immunize them against one common problem that
hinders them from becoming ideal Christians. And that fits the stipulated definition of ‘Christian
benefit’.51
But if SPUNCA meets the two conditions for violating SPUNCA, then we have a
troublesome situation on our hands. Climacus seems to be telling us:
Here is a bit of sophisticated philosophical understanding that is Christianly
advantageous: ‘sophisticated philosophical understanding is not Christianly
advantageous.’
Abstracting away, we get the following formal structure:
Here is an S that is P: ‘No S’s are P’s.’
This structure is obviously problematic. For the statement ‘No S’s are P’s’ serves as a counterexample to the claim it itself makes, viz. no S’s are P’s. We can describe this problem as a selfreference paradox or a self-referentially inconsistent statement. And, to the extent that it helps,
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We can raise the problem in a more concrete way by imagining the following person whom we will call

‘John’. On the one hand, John is philosophically inclined. He is what contemporary psychologists would call ‘high
in need for cognition’. As a result, he is the sort of person who will get distracted by philosophical investigations
into Christianity if he does not see the truth of SPUNCA. On the other hand, John is not terribly bright. Despite the
fact that he is philosophically inclined, he does not have what it takes to grasp sophisticated philosophical truths. In
particular, he does not have what it takes to see the truth of SPUNCA. If John exists—and it seems as though he
might—then knowledge of SPUNCA will provide those who have it with an unfair advantage over him.
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we can say it bears analogy to the relativist’s paradox (the only universal truth is that there are no
universal truths), Rorty’s paradox (the only good meta-level theory is that all meta-level theories
are bad), and the paradox of Socrates’ ignorance (the only thing Socrates knows is that he is
ignorant).
At this point it is worth noting that not every interpreter of Kierkegaard would balk at this
problem. Certain postmodern readers, who actually delight in the paradoxes and contradictions
they find in Kierkegaard’s writings, would embrace the problem rather than try to resolve it.52 I
admit to having a small amount of sympathy for this position and think there are times when it is
the right stance to take up. However, I do not think that now is one of those times. For I do not
believe we actually encounter a contradiction here. More pointedly, I do not believe SPUNCA
actually generates the self-reference paradox that it appears to generate. In the next two sections
(§§6-7), I will explain why I hold this position. My strategy will be to look at two accounts of
how Kierkegaard escapes the paradox. The first one will fail, but in an instructive way. The
second one will succeed.
6.

The Allison and Conant Solution to the Paradox

Two important commentators, Henry Allison and James Conant, have addressed something like
the paradox described above. They both acknowledge that one of Climacus’ goals in Postscript
is to make people aware that acquiring more philosophical knowledge will not help them with
the Christian project.53 In other words, they both admit that Climacus desires to communicate
something akin to SPUNCA. In addition, they both confess that the challenge facing
commentators is to understand how Climacus can accomplish this goal without contradicting
52
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himself, i.e. without turning SPUNCA itself into a piece of sophisticated philosophical
knowledge that provides Christian advantages.54 Here is how they take on that challenge.
Allison and Conant start by conceding that if we read Postscript straightforwardly, i.e. if
we read it as a serious philosophical work that should be taken at face value, we get our
paradox.55 However, both insist there are good reasons for not reading Postscript in this way.
First, Kierkegaard is aware of the relevant type of paradox. He even has Climacus describe
several tokens of it, some of which sound eerily similar to the one under investigation.56 Given
this fact, it would seem strange for him to fall prey to the paradox unintentionally.57 Second,
several of the arguments presented in Postscript appear so poorly constructed and so absurd that
it is hard to imagine someone with Kierkegaard’s intellectual acumen forwarding them
seriously.58 Third, Climacus revokes everything he says in Postscript and declares that the book
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conviction that “truth is inwardness; objectively there is no truth, but the appropriation is the truth” (CUP, p. 77).
The challenge facing this person is to communicate his conviction without turning it into something that is itself an
objective truth. On the very next page, Climacus describes the difficulty of communicating the conviction that “the
truth is not the truth but that the way is the truth, that is, that the truth is only in the becoming, in the process of
appropriation, that consequently there is no result” (CUP, p. 78). The challenge here is to communicate the position
without turning it into an instance of what it rejects, namely a truth in the form of a result. Finally, in the section on
Lessing, he discusses the problem of communicating the view that actual existence is important, while abstract
doctrines are not. The temptation here is to present the view as itself being an important abstract doctrine (CUP, pp.
122-123).
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is superfluous (CUP, pp. 618-621). A person with a serious philosophical message is not likely to
say this. Fourth, Climacus claims to be a humorist, someone whose fundamental attitude towards
life is not serious (CUP, pp. 501, 617). And fifth, when Climacus reviews his earlier work,
Philosophical Fragments, he downplays the importance of its content and emphasizes its ironic
or humorous form. These comments might make us suspicious that something similar goes on in
the Concluding Unscientific Postscript to “Philosophical Fragments”.59
The conclusion Allison and Conant draw from this evidence is that we should not treat
Postscript as a piece of serious philosophy or as a work that contains serious philosophical
positions. We should instead treat it as a joke—perhaps even a parody of serious pieces of
philosophy.60 This move does indeed let Climacus avoid the self-reference paradox. Postscript
no longer offers readers a Christianly advantageous piece of sophisticated philosophical
knowledge about how sophisticated philosophical knowledge is not Christianly advantageous. It
does not do so because it simply does not offer readers a piece of sophisticated philosophical
knowledge. It offers something else: a joke, a parody of sophisticated philosophical knowledge.
This position has received a significant amount of criticism in recent times. The standard
line of objection involves challenging the reasons Allison and Conant give for reading Postscript
as a joke.61 While these challenges are important, there is a much more effective way to attack
the Allison and Conant position. It runs as follows.
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To begin with, neither Allison nor Conant is content to say Postscript is merely a joke.
Both insist that, while it is a joke, it is a joke with a serious point.62 To leverage a phrase
Kierkegaard often uses, it is a unity of jest and earnestness (CUP, p. 274n). Both Conant and
Allison speak of this serious point in (what at least some people have called) non-cognitive
terms. Allison claims, for example, that the joke serves to help us “see” or “come to grips with”
the futility or irrelevance of philosophy when it comes to the task of being Christian.63 Conant
adds that Climacus uses the joke to “show” or “reveal” to us that, with respect to Christianity,
there is nothing more we need to know.64 He also talks about how the joke “shatters the illusion”
that we can get somewhere, Christianly speaking, by acquiring philosophical understanding.65
Allison and Conant use non-cognitive terminology to speak about the serious point of
Climacus’ parody for a very important reason. They want to avoid saying that Climacus is trying
to get us to know something or that he is trying to impart philosophical understanding to us.66 If
they came out and said either of these things, the paradox would have its revenge. For the
relevant bit of knowledge or understanding would certainly be that philosophical understanding
is not Christianly advantageous. Hence, Climacus would once again be trying to communicate
the Christianly advantageous piece of philosophical understanding that philosophical
understanding is not Christianly advantageous. And that is just the original paradox of
communicating SPUNCA. Of course, Climacus would now be communicating SPUNCA by way
of a joke and not by way of an ordinary assertion. But the paradox would arise nonetheless.
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The pivotal question, therefore, is whether it really helps to speak about the serious point
of Postscript in non-cognitive terms. Does it really allow Allison and Conant to avoid the
revenge of the paradox? I do not think so. The main reason is that it seems right to extend the
domain of SPUNCA so that it covers the kind of non-cognitive states Allison and Conant have in
mind. That is to say, it seems right to interpret SPUNCA so that it rules out Christian advantages
stemming from sophisticated non-cognitive states in addition to those stemming from
sophisticated cognitive states. For if there were a non-cognitive state that provided Christian
advantages only to the select few who were sophisticated or clever enough to adopt it, we would
once again have a violation of the egalitarian conception of Christianity. And it would make little
sense for Kierkegaard to allow a violation here but not with respect to cognitive attitudes.
Indeed, on what basis could Kierkegaard treat cognitive and non-cognitive states thus
differently?
On this expanded interpretation of SPUNCA, Allison and Conant’s appeal to noncognitive terminology does not help. When construed in non-cognitive terms, the serious point of
Postscript still violates SPUNCA. And since the serious point of Postscript on the non-cognitive
account is to get us to see SPUNCA, we once again have a version of our original paradox. In
particular, Climacus is prompting us to adopt a Christianly advantageous non-cognitive state in
which we can see inter alia that such non-cognitive states cannot be Christianly advantageous.
7.

An Alternative Solution to the Paradox

I laud Allison and Conant for taking the paradox seriously and I think they are right to focus on
humor as the key to getting around it. However, I believe they go astray in several ways. First,
they are wrong to say we must stop reading Postscript straightforwardly. Second, they are wrong
to appeal to non-cognitive states. Finally, they are wrong about the precise way in which
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Postscript is humorous. There is, however, a way to go that does not fall prey to their mistakes.
In what follows, I will outline the steps to this alternative solution.
The first step is to deny that SPUNCA is itself a piece of sophisticated philosophical
understanding. It might be a piece of understanding or even a piece of philosophical
understanding, but it is not sophisticated. It is, instead, something a simple person can grasp. For
a simple person can grasp the idea that, when it comes to following Christ, becoming a serious
philosopher or theologian is no advantage. In fact, most simple people already accept some
version of this principle, at least implicitly. As Climacus says, the simple person “feels no need
for a deeper understanding” (CUP, pp. 180-181) and “finds comfort in the thought that life’s
happiness does not consist in being a person of knowledge” (CUP, p. 170n**).
The upshot of this first step is that SPUNCA does not actually generate a self-reference
paradox. To recall, SPUNCA rules out the possibility of information that (1) is so sophisticated
that simple people cannot grasp it and yet (2) provides some Christian benefit that simple people
cannot acquire in some other way. In order for a self-reference paradox to arise, SPUNCA itself
would have to meet both conditions. But given what we have just said, we can see this is not the
case. In particular, the first condition is not met: simple or unsophisticated people can and do
grasp SPUNCA.
This is all well and good, someone might say, but Climacus does not write for simple
people. As he repeatedly tells us, he writes for the speculative thinkers—thinkers who happen to
be quite sophisticated (CUP, pp. 170n**, 383). These people do feel a need for deeper
understanding; that is part of what makes them sophisticated people. Because they feel this need,
they will not embrace SPUNCA without good reasons for doing so. Appropriately, part of what
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Climacus does in Postscript is to provide them with such reasons, one of which I have outlined
above.
But now our paradox threatens to return. Here’s why. First, even if SPUNCA itself is not
sophisticated, the arguments given in its defense certainly are. We would not be hard pressed to
find people who lack the intellectual ability to grasp them. Second, these arguments provide
Climacus’ sophisticated readers with an important Christian benefit that they could not get in any
other way. For without these arguments, the sophisticated readers of Postscript will not accept
SPUNCA and hence will continue to engage in philosophical reflection instead of living
Christianly. Putting these points together, we have a piece of information that is both
philosophically sophisticated and Christianly beneficial to know. That is, we once again have an
apparent violation of SPUNCA. Granted, it is not SPUNCA itself that comprises the new
counter-example but rather the arguments for SPUNCA. Still, these arguments occur within
Postscript and Postscript endorses SPUNCA. Therefore, we can say that Postscript seemingly
serves as a counter-example to one of the theses it endorses. And that sounds like our original
self-reference paradox, albeit in slightly different form.
To avoid this sticky situation, we must take a second step: we must recognize the way in
which Postscript is a humorous book. To start off, note that the sophisticated arguments for
SPUNCA contained in Postscript really only have derivative value. That is to say, they only
have value insofar as they help people accept SPUNCA, and it is accepting SPUNCA that
provides the real Christian benefits. However, as argued above, the benefits of accepting
SPUNCA are already enjoyed by simple people. For simple people start out from the point of
embracing this truth. Therefore, all things considered, the sophisticated arguments of Postscript
do not provide the sophisticated people who can understand them with any benefits that
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unsophisticated people do not already possess. That is to say, after more than 600 pages,
Postscript brings its sophisticated readers no further than where the simple man on the street gets
without reading it. And this is what makes it a humorous book.67 Climacus foreshadows the
humorous point in the following passage:
[H]ow close to satire it is that one has spent time and energy for a number of years and
ends up with nothing more than what the most obtuse person knows—rather than, alas,
during the same time and with the same energy, possibly having accomplished something
pertaining to China, Persia, even astronomy (CUP, p. 498).
He acknowledges it explicitly at the end of Postscript:
I am a friend of difficulties, especially of those that have the humorous quality, so that the
most cultured person, after having gone through the most enormous effort, essentially has
come no further than the simplest human being can come (CUP, p. 607).
To put the point another way, what pertains to Christianity generally, applies to Postscript as
well: “more understanding goes no further than less understanding. On the contrary they go
equally far, the exceptionally gifted person slowly, the simple person swiftly” (CUP, p. 607).68
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We can now see why Climacus’ sophisticated arguments for SPUNCA do not constitute a
counter-example to SPUNCA. They would constitute a counterexample only if both (1) they
were so sophisticated that simple people could not understand them and yet (2) they provided a
Christian benefit that simple people could not acquire in some other way. But given what we
have just said, we know the arguments for SPUNCA do not meet the second condition. While the
arguments do provide a Christian benefit, it is not one that “simple people cannot acquire in
some other way.” Rather, it is one that can be and indeed is had by those too simple to
understand the arguments. Thus we can say that the arguments do not bring the intellectual elite
beyond the simple people. Rather, they take the intellectual elite, who on account of their
sophistication think they have gone beyond the simple people, to the place where the simple
people already are. Therefore, not only SPUNCA itself but the arguments for SPUNCA avoid a
self-reference paradox.
8.

Additional Objections and Replies

There are several further objections that threaten to undermine the philosophical coherence of
SPUNCA and, more generally, the version of egalitarianism that Climacus endorses in
Postscript. In this final section of the paper, I will look at three of the most troubling objections
and offer a number of potential responses.
8.1.

First Objection and Reply

Notice that Climacus seems to have turned the tables on the Hegelians. Far from its being the
case that their sophistication provides them with an advantage with respect to Christianity, it
seems to provide them with a disadvantage. To be specific, it is a lot harder for them to come to
terms with SPUNCA than it is for simple people. Unlike simple people, the Hegelians do not
start out from the point of accepting this position. They must take the time to find or develop
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reasons for accepting it first. Moreover, unlike simple people, the Hegelians have a deep
psychological need to acquire sophisticated philosophical understanding. Such a need makes
them naturally inclined to reject SPUNCA. Climacus acknowledges the basic point here when he
says that “cultured people have only a very ironic advantage over simple folk with regard to
becoming and continuing to be Christians: the advantage that it is more difficult” (CUP, p. 606).
Given this situation, someone might object that we now face an inverted version of our
original problem. There are still some people who have an easier time with Christianity—it just
happens to be the simple people instead of the smart people. But if Climacus’ egalitarian
interpretation of Christianity holds, if Christianity is “equally difficult for all,” then this
difference is out of place. Indeed, why should it be acceptable for the simple people to have an
advantage now when it was not acceptable for the smart people to have an advantage before?
This objection rests on a failure to understand the “equally difficult for all” corollary in
the way Climacus intends it. True, Climacus wants to interpret the Christian task so that it
requires the same amount of effort of everyone. But for him this means the difficulty of the task
must be indexed to the abilities of the individual. He says:
[T]o become a Christian is actually the most difficult of all tasks, because the task,
although the same, varies in relation to the capabilities of the respective individuals. This
is not the case with tasks involving differences (CUP, p. 377).
And later:
[E]very essential existence task [and Christianity is the paradigmatic one] pertains
equally to every human being and therefore makes the difficulty proportionate to the
individual’s endowment (CUP, p. 383).
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The upshot is that the person with greater abilities will face greater challenges and the person
with lesser abilities will face lesser challenges. Climacus could find support here from the
parable of the talents69 and the parable of the faithful servant70: to whom much has been given,
much will be required. On this version of egalitarianism, it is not a problem that Christianity is
more difficult for the more sophisticated people. It is precisely the way things ought to be.
8.2.

Second Objection and Reply

Notice that an egalitarian view of Christianity not only entails that sophisticated people cannot
have an unfair advantage over simple people (and vice versa), but also that the people of one
generation cannot have an unfair advantage over the people of another generation. Climacus
recognizes this point. He argues in Philosophical Fragments that those who lived at the time of
Christ had no advantage vis-à-vis becoming Christian over those who lived and are living in later
generations.71 Climacus makes the complementary point in Postscript: “It has not become easier
to become a Christian in the nineteenth century than in the first period” (CUP, p. 606; see also
CUP, p. 97).72 As a kind of summary statement of his position, he asks rhetorically:
Would God really bring about a reconciliation with a few human beings such that their
reconciliation with Him would make their difference from everyone else a glaring
injustice? ...Would God allow the power of time to decide whom he would grant his
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favor? Or would it not rather be worthy of God to make reconciliation with Him equally
difficult for every person in every time and every place.73
Given my interpretation, however, Postscript might appear to violate this additional
corollary. Here’s why. First, Postscript was written in 1846 and hence was not available to those
who lived earlier. Second, as discussed, Postscript provides its sophisticated readers with an
important Christian benefit. By convincing them of the truth of SPUNCA, it helps immunize
them against the disease of excessive reflection that distracts them from their everyday Christian
tasks. Therefore, unless the sophisticated people who lived prior to 1846 could acquire the
benefit gained by reading Postscript in some other way, the sophisticated readers of Postscript
would have an unfair advantage over them.74
In part, what is at stake here is the originality of Postscript. If Postscript is the first to
defend SPUNCA, if no earlier book or person or revelation had ever done so, then we definitely
have a violation of Climacus’ egalitarian principles on our hands. The first thing to say in
response to this potential problem is that Climacus denies providing readers with anything new.
This is partly what he means when he suggests that he has not made any matchless discoveries
(CUP, p. 617), that the book is superfluous (CUP, pp. 618-619), and that he only knows what
everyone else knows (CUP, p. 623). Perhaps more importantly, Kierkegaard himself denies the
originality of Postscript. In “A First and Last Explanation”, which he appends to Postscript
under his own name, he claims that the value of the pseudonymous works “unconditionally does
not consist in making any new proposal, some unheard-of discovery, or in founding a new party
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and wanting to go further” (CUP, pp. 629-630).75 Their value consists only in providing one
more reading of the old familiar scriptural texts (ibid.).
Of course, it is one thing to say Postscript is unoriginal; it is another for this to be the
case. What actual precursors might exist? One possible antecedent to Postscript’s attack on
Hegelianism is the early Christian attack on Gnosticism. Gnosticism is a heterogeneous
phenomenon and scholars struggle to identify a unified set of Gnostic teachings or practices.76
Nevertheless, one strand of Gnosticism held that there is a secret knowledge revealed only to the
initiated that is necessary for salvation.77 Early Christians such as Irenaeus attacked this strand of
Gnosticism in part because it denied that knowledge of God was openly available to all.78 The
parallel to Climacus’ attack on the Hegelians is obvious. Both attacks involve objecting to the
notion that there exists knowledge that (1) is accessible only to a select group of people and yet
(2) provides a benefit for living the Christian life that cannot be had in any other way. There are
good reasons to think Kierkegaard recognized this parallel. First, the Biblical scholar F. C. Baur
(1792-1860) had written about it in his Die Christliche Gnosis, which Kierkegaard owned and
read.79 Second, Climacus states at one point that “giving thinking supremacy over everything
else”—which is an oblique reference to the Hegelian position—“is Gnosticism” (CUP, p. 341).
Thus it seems possible that Kierkegaard has Gnosticism in mind, and with some right, when he
says that Postscript does not contain anything substantially new.
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Finding historical precursors to Postscript, however, does not entirely solve the problem.
Even if there were many such precursors, we might still have a violation of egalitarianism on our
hands. In particular, if the precursors to Postscript were not widely known—in fact if they were
not universally known by all sophisticated people—the sophisticated people who lacked access
to them would be at a disadvantage. These people could not gain the benefits enjoyed by those
people who had a chance to read a book like Postscript.
What we have here is essentially a version of the well-known theological problem created
by the existence of those who have never heard the Christian gospel. An exhaustive treatment of
this problem would take us beyond the primarily philosophical scope of this paper. Nevertheless,
the connection to the egalitarian principles that lie at the heart of Climacus’ objection to
Hegelianism makes a modest venture into this territory both necessary and worthwhile. Thus I
will conclude the paper by taking a brief look at the problem in question and examining two
responses we find in Kierkegaard’s writings, paying special attention to their implications for the
attack on the Hegelians.
8.3.

Third Objection and Reply

On most orthodox accounts of Christianity, having a certain amount of historical knowledge
about Jesus Christ is necessary for salvation. Climacus toes the orthodox line on this point. He
says that “the single individual’s salvation indeed depends on his being brought into relation to
that historical event [the Incarnation]” (CUP, p. 584). A problem arises because a great number
of people die without learning anything about Christ. And for the vast majority of these people,
their ignorance is no fault of their own. It is due to the accidental circumstances of their lives:
they are born at the wrong time or in the wrong place. Compared with those who have had the
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good fortune to hear the Christian story, these people are at an unfair disadvantage. Thus it seems
Christianity is not “equally difficult for every person in every time and every place”.80
The first response to this problem that we find in Kierkegaard’s writings comes at the end
of Postscript. Here Climacus simply bites the bullet. He weakens his egalitarian conception of
Christianity and allows for an exception with respect to those who have not heard about the
gospel. These people, he concedes, do not get treated fairly. They are “excluded [from salvation]
through no fault of their own but by the accidental circumstance that Christianity has not yet
been proclaimed to them” (CUP, pp. 582-583). Climacus admits that this is an unhappy
consequence of his position. But its unhappiness does not lead him to reject his position.
The difficulty with this response is that it undermines Climacus’ main theoretical
objection to Hegelianism. To recall, Hegelianism entails that the speculative thinkers have pride
of place in the realm of religion by dint of their sophisticated philosophical knowledge. Climacus
finds this position repugnant because it privileges a specific group of people on the basis of an
accidental characteristic or circumstance. We now see, however, that Climacus’ own treatment
of the unevangelized does much the same thing. It too entails that a specific group of people
enjoy an unfair advantage due to the accidental circumstances of their lives. Therefore, if
Climacus stands by his treatment of the unevangelized, he can no longer object to Hegelianism
simply because it privileges people on the basis of accidental characteristics or circumstances. He
must add something about why the particular way in which Hegelianism makes this move is
80
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problematic. More specifically, he must explain why the fortuitous features Hegelianism selects
(viz. one’s intellectual ability and education) creates a problem that does not arise mutatis
mutandis for the fortuitous features he selects (viz. time and place of one’s existence). It is
unclear, however, what philosophical considerations Climacus could appeal to as a basis for
treating these features differently.81 As Evans puts it, “if the principle of equality is weakened to
take into account accidents of time and geography, it is hard to see why it should not be further
weakened to take into account other sorts of ‘accidents of upbringing’”.82 Without something to
say here, Climacus’ main objection to Hegelianism loses its teeth.
Kierkegaard’s second response to the problem of the unevangelized preserves the
egalitarian principle weakened by the first response. It does so by expanding on an idea
discussed earlier. Recall how, to combat the possibility that simple people have a paradoxical
advantage over sophisticated people, Climacus suggested that the task of Christianity was
different for the two groups of people. In particular, he suggested that the difficulty of the task
was correlated with the abilities of each group. Kierkegaard takes this idea and, in a late journal
entry, applies it to the problem of the unevangelized:
As soon as the question of a man’s eternal salvation is made commensurable with a
decision in time by a relation to something historical occurring in time, the nightmare
comes at once, the torments of sympathy, that there will be countless millions who will
not be eternally saved. If one thinks with regard to the countless millions who lived
81
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before this historical event and the countless millions who live after it but in complete
ignorance of it, if one assumes that they could not possibly be eternally damned for this
reason—if one assumes this and finds a sympathetic relief in it, the matter still remains
painful with respect to the millions who lived afterwards, or for every individual in
relation to the countless many who are his contemporaries and to whom that historical
event is proclaimed but upon whom it does not make a decisive impression. The more
exactly the terms of salvation are stipulated, the fewer there always are who one can
believe will be saved. But sympathy finds it tormenting to be saved in contradistinction to
others. So I have interpreted it as follows: the terms of salvation differ for every
individual, for every single solitary human being.83
Kierkegaard explicitly states here that the requirements for salvation are specific to the
individual. Given the context, the implication is that the task can vary not only with respect to
one’s intellectual abilities but with respect to any of one’s circumstances and endowments,
including the time and place in which one lives. This proposal effectively removes the
possession of historical knowledge of Christ as a necessary requirement for salvation. People
who lack this knowledge will be held to a different standard, one that is appropriate to their
situation. In this way, the evangelized no longer have an unfair advantage over the unevangelized
and Kierkegaard no longer has a violation of egalitarianism on his hands.
Unfortunately, this second response indirectly weakens another one of Climacus’
criticisms of the Hegelians. For if we assume the conditions for salvation are specific to people’s
circumstances and capabilities, it follows that the Hegelians too will have their own conditions
for salvation. And it seems possible that these conditions will involve remaining true to
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Hegelianism. In order to become saved, they might need to continue engaging in sophisticated
philosophical reflection. (Perhaps that is just what God has called them to do!) The mere
possibility of this scenario entails that Climacus cannot be sure that engaging in philosophical
reflection hinders the Hegelians from becoming ideal Christians. He cannot be sure that it
distracts them from doing their everyday Christian tasks. Indeed, any blanket claim about the
negative Christian value of reflection would presuppose a version of the one-size-fits-all
Christianity that the response under consideration rejects. These considerations considerably
weaken one of Climacus’ attacks on the Hegelians. For as we saw in §1, Climacus wants to say
the Hegelians go astray, Christianly speaking, when they spend so much time engaged in
philosophical reflection. He could not say this with confidence if he accepted the second
response to the problem of the unevangelized.
That being said, accepting the second response would not prevent Climacus from leveling
his main theoretical objection against the Hegelians. He could still say they are wrong to endorse
a form of intellectual elitism that gives them pride of place in the realm of religion by dint of
their sophisticated philosophical knowledge. Granted, the Hegelians might be right in thinking
that acquiring such knowledge helps them attain the highest mode of religious existence. Thus
they might be right in spending all their time engaged in philosophical reflection. But they would
be wrong in their belief that acquiring sophisticated philosophical knowledge is the conditio sine
qua non of the highest mode of religious life. And thus they would be wrong in placing
themselves above those who did not possess such knowledge simply because those others did not
possess it. This, of course, is the real point behind SPUNCA. Therefore, it is possible for
Climacus to address the problem of the unevangelized without abandoning this core thesis of
Postscript.
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